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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 A jury convicted Hurby Septimus McCalla pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1326 for his unauthorized reentry into the United States 
as an alien who had previously been deported after an aggravated 
felony conviction.  At the time of his deportation, McCalla was 
given a standard Form I-294 notice which warned that his reentry 
into the United States without first procuring the permission of 
the United States Attorney General would expose him to a maximum 
prison sentence of two years.  The two year penalty indicated on 
the form was a misstatement of the actual statutory maximum 
penalty of up to 15 years imprisonment.  The main issue we 
address is whether the government should have been precluded 
under the theory of fair warning, the rule of lenity, or the 
doctrine of entrapment from seeking a sentence in excess of two 
years and ultimately, whether the district court erred in 
sentencing McCalla to a prison term which substantially exceeded 
the two years described in the notice. 
 
 I. 
 Hurby Septimus McCalla1 was deported on or about 
April 9, 1991.  At that time, he received and signed Immigration 
and Naturalization Service Form I-294, which stated: 
                     
1
.   McCalla has used a variety of aliases.  He was 
convicted in New Jersey Superior Court on May 3, 1988, for 
possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to 
  
 Should you wish to return to the United 
States you must write [the United States 
Department of Justice, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service] or the American 
Consular Office nearest your residence abroad 
as to how to obtain permission to return 
after deportation.  By law (Title 8 of United 
States Code, Section 1326) any deported 
person who within five years returns without 
permission is guilty of a felony.  If 
convicted he may be punished by imprisonment 
of not more than two years and/or a fine of 
not more than $1,000.00. 
 
S.A. 1 (emphasis added). 
 The INS Form I-294 given McCalla had not been revised 
to reflect changes in section 1326 of Title 8, U.S.C., which had 
occurred on November 18, 1988 and November 19, 1990.  The 1988 
amendment to section 1326 added a subsection (b), providing for 
enhanced penalties where the defendant has had prior felony 
convictions.  A second amendment in 1990 increased the associated 
maximum fine from $1,000 to $250,000 in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3571(b)(3).  Consequently, the portions of section 1326 
(..continued) 
distribute and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance 
under the name Michael G. Smith.  As a result of that conviction, 
McCalla was deported from the United States on April 9, 1991, 
under the name Terrance George Beecham.  On April 15, 1992, 
McCalla was arrested in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, under the 
name, Thomas Harding.  Apparently, on June 30, 1992, McCalla was 
again arrested, this time under the name, Dennis Clark, but a 
fingerprint analysis identified him to be the same person as 
Thomas Harding.  On January 21, 1993, McCalla admitted that his 
true name is Hurby Septimus McCalla.  A combination of comparison 
photographs and fingerprint analyses compiled from local police 
department records and FBI records established that all of the 
above names, and other names or spellings, refer to one and the 
same Hurby Septimus McCalla. 
  
applicable to McCalla at the time of his deportation were as 
follows:   
 (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this 
section, any alien who --  
  (1) has been arrested and deported 
or excluded and deported, and 
thereafter 
  (2) enters . . . or is at any time 
found in, the United States, unless 
(A) prior to his reembarkation at a 
place outside the United States 
. . . the Attorney General has 
expressly consented to such alien's 
reapplying for admission; or (B) 
with respect to an alien previously 
excluded and deported, unless such 
alien shall establish that he was 
not required to obtain such advance 
consent under this chapter or any 
prior Act,  
  
 shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned 
not more than 2 years, or both. 
 
 (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this 
section, in the case of any alien described 
in such subsection -- 
   * * * 
  (2) whose deportation was 
subsequent to a conviction for 
commission of an aggravated felony, 
such alien shall be fined under 
such Title, imprisoned not more 
than 15 years, or both.   
 
8 U.S.C. § 1326 (as amended Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 
Stat. 4471; Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 5059).   
 On or about April 15, 1992,2 McCalla was found in 
Philadelphia, having reentered the United States without first 
                     
2
.   The indictment charged that McCalla was found in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on or about April 15, 1992, under 
circumstances which brought his presence in the United States to 
the attention of local police authorities.  He was at a night 
club when a security guard noticed he was carrying a loaded 
  
applying to the Attorney General of the United States for 
admission and receiving her express consent pursuant to section 
1326.  He was thus charged with a violation of section 
1326(b)(2). 
 At trial, the court precluded defense counsel from 
raising to the jury the issue of whether McCalla could be 
properly charged pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) in light of the 
errors contained in Form I-294.  The jury returned a guilty 
verdict on the single count indictment.  At sentencing, McCalla 
argued that the government was bound to the misstatements made in 
Form I-294 in seeking his sentence, and therefore that the 
government was precluded from seeking a sentence in excess of 2 
years despite the 15 year maximum imprisonment provided in 
section 1326(b)(2).  Nonetheless, the court calculated McCalla's 
offense range at 100 to 125 months pursuant to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, and imposed a sentence of 112 months 
imprisonment with three years supervised release following 
completion of his prison sentence and a financial penalty in the 
amount of $50.00.3 
 
(..continued) 
pistol and telephoned the police, who subsequently arrested him.  
The complaint alleged that McCalla was found in the United States 
on or about January 20, 1993.  That date coincides with the date 
he was placed in the custody of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service after completing sentences for local 
offenses. 
3
.   The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This is an appeal from a final 
judgment of conviction and order of sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
  
 II. 
 The issue of whether due process mandates that the 
government be limited to the maximum sentence promulgated by the 
government's own inaccurate notice of the current law is one of 
first impression in this circuit.   
 McCalla argues that due process, fundamental fairness 
and the rule of lenity militate against imposition of a prison 
sentence in excess of that which the government has clearly 
represented it could be.  He further argues that the public 
policy supporting the doctrine of entrapment would preclude the 
government from receiving a "benefit" from its act of 
misrepresentation.  Thus McCalla seeks to have this case remanded 
to the district court for resentencing within a two-year sentence 
limitation. 
 Our sister courts of appeals have recently rejected the 
arguments which McCalla raises before us.  In United States v. 
Perez-Torres, 15 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 1994), a case involving the 
very same act of misrepresentation on the part of INS, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held: 
 Form I-294 is not a criminal statute.  Hence, 
the defect [the defendant] complains of lies 
not in the underlying statute, but rather in 
a provision of a document with no relevant 
legal force.  As [the defendant] concedes, 
section 1326 clearly and unambiguously 
articulated the penalties associated with a 
reentry offense.  Thus, regardless of the 
inaccuracy of Form I-294, the statute under 
which [the defendant] was convicted provided 
notice adequate to satisfy the requirements 
of due process.   
 
Id. at 406.   
  
 Similarly, in reversing the decision of its district 
court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in United 
States v. Sanchez-Montoya, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 18,742, *2 (9th 
Cir. July 26, 1994) that, 
 
 [N]either due process nor principles of 
equitable estoppel precludes imposing a 
prison term exceeding two years for illegal 
reentry on a defendant who had been advised 
erroneously by the INS before deportation 
that the maximum penalty for that offense was 
two years.  [citing United States v. Ullyses-
Salazar, No. 93-50144, Slip op. 6543, 6549, 
6551-52 (9th Cir. June 20, 1994)].  We also 
conclude[] that such circumstances do not 
constitute a valid basis for a downward 
departure.  [Citing id. at 6553.] 
 
Accord United States v. Samaniego-Rodriguez, 1994 W.L. 401595 
(7th Cir. Aug. 4, 1994) (Form I-294 cannot give rise to a due 
process violation and section 1326 unquestionably satisfies all 
due process requirements); United States v. Shaw, 1994 W.L. 
244362 (7th Cir. June 7, 1994) (pre-deportation warning that 
reentry is punishable by a maximum of two years does not render 
the 46-month sentence imposed a violation of due process).   
 We agree with our sister courts of appeals.  Although 
the inaccuracy in Form I-294 was regrettable, perhaps 
inexcusable, due process requires that it is the criminal statute 
which must clearly set forth the activity which constitutes a 
crime and the punishment authorized for committing such a crime.  
See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 121 (1979) (a 
statute which ambiguously specifies criminal conduct or the 
penalties authorized upon conviction raises a constitutional 
  
question).  Section 1326(b)(2) clearly comports with the due 
process requirement of fair notice.  
 Similarly, the rule of lenity applies to ambiguous 
criminal statutes.  Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14-15 
(1978) (ambiguities in either the substantive or sentencing 
provisions of criminal statutes justify application of lenity);  
United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(lenity only applies where reasonable doubt persists concerning 
ambit of statute even after review of statutory text, structure, 
legislative history and polices).  Section 1326(b)(2) is not 
ambiguous and we decline to employ the rule of lenity to override 
the indisputable terms of the criminal statute. 
 Finally, the defense of entrapment serves to protect 
against a deception on the part of the government that induces a 
criminal act by "actually implant[ing] the criminal design in the 
mind of the defendant."  United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 
436 (1973).  Furthermore, a claim of entrapment requires proof 
that the defendant lacked predisposition to commit the crime.  
Id. (entrapment defense requires government inducement and lack 
of predisposition); see also United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 
42, 44 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207 (1991).  
Neither of those elements is shown here.  Form I-294 did not 
mislead McCalla as to what constituted the specific criminal act; 
nor do we regard the misstatement as to the punitive sentence 
relevant to proving McCalla's predisposition.  McCalla willfully 
reentered the United States despite the government's express 
  
notice that such reentry would constitute a felony.  Public 
policy militates against equity here.4    
 
 III. 
 McCalla raises other claims which we find meritless.  
McCalla claims, for example, that the use of his prior aggravated 
felony conviction to enhance his punishment was in violation of 
the ex post facto clause.  We hold, however, that because the 
violation of section 1326(b) occurred subsequent to the effective 
date of the statutory amendment which provided for an enhanced 
punishment, there was no ex post facto violation.  The date of 
McCalla's prior criminal conduct is not relevant for purposes of 
an ex post facto analysis here.  See Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 
728, 732 (1948); United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730, 734 
(9th Cir. 1994) ("[f]or purposes of analyzing . . . statutes 
increasing penalties for future crimes based on past crimes, the 
relevant `offense' is the current crime, not the predicate 
crime"). 
 McCalla also asserts that evidence of the circumstances 
under which his reentry came to the attention of authorities and 
of his subsequent arrest processing was unduly prejudicial and 
improperly admitted into evidence, and hence that he is entitled 
                     
4
.   At trial, defense counsel argued that the government 
should be estopped from proving any elements of section 
1326(b)(2) calling for a penalty in excess of two years, the 
implication being that McCalla detrimentally relied in good faith 
upon the government's misrepresentation in deciding to risk the 
commission of a felony.  McCalla precluded a finding of good 
faith, however, by his willful violation of the criminal law.  
  
to a new trial.  McCalla further contends that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to 
object to the allegedly improper introduction of this evidence.  
In ruling on the motion in limine, the court held that the 
evidence was admissible to the extent that it was a foundation 
for an understanding of the sequence of events which established 
McCalla's surreptitious and voluntary presence in the United 
States.  Furthermore, in light of McCalla's various aliases, the 
evidence helped to establish his identity.  We hold that it was 
well within the district court's sound discretion to permit the 
evidence, and in light of the overwhelming case against McCalla, 
we do not find any evidence of prejudice or a manifest 
miscarriage of justice requisite to a finding of ineffective 
assistance of counsel raised first on direct appeal.  Moreover, 
testimony concerning the basis of McCalla's prior sentence, given 
on redirect examination in response to questions asked during 
cross-examination, was invited, and admission of that evidence 
does not constitute plain error. 
 Finally, McCalla asserts that the deportation hearing 
which he was afforded in 1991 did not comport with due process or 
the statutes and regulations apropos to such hearings.  He argues 
that the alleged deficiency of his deportation hearing precludes 
using his prior deportation as the basis of the section 1326 
charge against him.  Specifically, McCalla asserts that the use 
of a telephonic hearing directly contravened the mandate of 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b), which governs the determination of 
deportability.  McCalla further alleges that the deportation 
  
order was predicated upon a record of conviction which the 
immigration judge never saw, instead relying solely on McCalla's 
admission and the representations of the prosecutor that such a 
record exists and as to its contents.5   
 We acknowledge that a severely deficient deportation 
proceeding which effectively deprives the defendant of his right 
of direct appeal may preclude use of that deportation as a 
predicate to prosecution under section 1326.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 838 (1984) ("where the 
defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review 
of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining judicial 
review must be made available before the administrative order may 
be used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal 
offense").  McCalla has failed to demonstrate, however, that he 
was effectively deprived of his right of direct appeal and we 
will not dismiss the section 1326 charge against him.   
 
                     
5
.   We note here that in granting the government's motion 
to preclude evidence of the alleged invalidity of McCalla's 
deportation, the court held that McCalla had waived his right to 
collaterally attack the validity of his deportation proceeding 
because he had not raised any due process challenge to the 
indictment prior to trial in accordance with the time provisions 
set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 and Local Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11.  See Memorandum Order of the District 
Court, Criminal Action No. 93-128 (May 11, 1993, at p. 9, S.A. 
151).  Nevertheless, the court heard the merits of that claim and 
ruled that McCalla had failed to meet his burden to establish a 
due process violation.  S.A. 151-58. 
  
 IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of sentence 
entered on September 17, 1993, against Hurby Septimus McCalla in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania will be affirmed. 
  
_________________________ 
 
 
 
MCKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
  While I agree with the majority in all other 
respects, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority 
opinion.  The majority reasons that, despite the fact that the 
government disseminated the inaccurate maximum penalty 
information printed on form I-294 to McCalla (and countless other 
deportees), McCalla's sentence in excess of two years does not 
offend due process because the relevant statute gave notice to 
all the world of its contents.    Notice of the conduct 
that a statute proscribes and the penalty prescribed for such 
conduct are fundamental to due process of law.  See McBoyle v. 
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).  The statement on form I-
294, did not give McCalla accurate information and fair warning 
regarding "what the law intends to do if a certain line is 
passed."  Id.  Accordingly, traditional notions of fairness 
inherent in the requirement of due process should preclude us 
  
from allowing McCalla to be sentenced to more than the two years 
that the government represented to be the maximum sentence. 
  Although the government was justified in its 
efforts to incarcerate McCalla based upon his illegal return to 
this country, our holding today does not properly consider the 
totality of the circumstances of McCalla's deportation and the 
context in which he received the "information" in form I-294.  
The record before us establishes that once it is determined that 
an individual will be deported, the government makes flight 
arrangements for the deportee.  At the appointed time, the 
deportee is escorted to the airport in handcuffs by two 
deportation officers who fingerprint the deportee and are 
responsible for making sure that the deportee signs the warrant 
of deportation.  Prior to departure the handcuffs are removed, 
and the warrant of deportation is read to the deportee and then 
given to him or her along with a copy of form I-294.  He or she 
is then put on the airplane, and the appropriate travel 
documentation is given to an airline attendant.  
  In this coercive atmosphere the government clearly 
intends for the deportee to read and rely upon the information 
and warnings in each of the documents that are presented to him 
or her.  Indeed, McCalla was given form I-294 so that he would 
take note of, and heed, the warnings it contained.  We now allow 
the government to successfully assert that the contents of the 
form are irrelevant to McCalla's notice.   
  
  We charge the defendant with knowledge because of 
the unambiguous statute, yet we do not charge the government 
agency responsible for enforcing this country's immigration laws 
with the same notice, and we excuse the error in this form. It 
stands reality on its head to suggest that the unambiguous 
statute buried within one particular volume of the United States 
Code sitting somewhere upon the shelves in far off law libraries 
somehow reaches out to McCalla in these circumstances and trumps 
the "information" in form I-294.  
  I fail to understand the logic or fairness of a 
position which charges this defendant with knowledge based upon 
the publication of a statute yet fails to attribute that same 
knowledge to duly appointed agents of the Attorney General of the 
United States, or the agency of the government responsible for 
enforcing immigration laws.  All parties seem to agree that the 
INS did not intentionally mislead McCalla because the INS did not 
realize that the information contained in form I-294 was wrong 
when agents handed it to McCalla.  Yet, this defendant who is not 
responsible for enforcing the law, is charged with notice of the 
change in the law.  
  Courts have traditionally held that one must know 
the consequences of an action before one can be held criminally 
accountable for the action.  Thus, due process and fair notice 
dictate that a defendant cannot be punished when the statute does 
not clearly define the criminal conduct.  McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 
  
27. In addition, no penalty can be imposed if a statute does not 
prescribe punishment for certain conduct. United States v. Evans, 
333 U.S. 483, 495 (1948).  Accordingly, under the circumstances 
of this case, it is reasonable to limit the government to the 
sentence that it has represented to be the maximum penalty. I 
believe fundamental fairness requires nothing less. 
  The rationale asserted by the government and 
adopted by the majority elevates the maxim that "ignorance of the 
law is no excuse" to a mantra which has hindered realistic 
analysis here.  The Supreme Court recently had occasion to limit 
the use of this "age old maxim" in Ratzlaf v. United States,     
U.S.    , 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).  Ratzlaf, though clearly 
distinguishable, teaches that the existence of a statute cannot 
serve to give notice of its contents for all purposes even when a 
defendant engages in conduct known to be improper.  Id. at 663.  
McCalla was aware of the contents of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) just 
as the defendant in Ratzlaf was aware of the contents of the 
statutes at issue in that case.  Both defendants knew that they 
were engaging in conduct that was improper.  The Court in 
Ratzlaf, however, held that the defendant could not be charged 
with knowledge that his conduct was a crime.  See id. at 658.  
Just as the defendant in Ratzlaf could not be charged with 
knowledge of the criminal nature of his activity, the 
circumstances surrounding McCalla's deportation should preclude 
charging him with knowledge of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.  
  
  Thus, absent controlling precedent to the 
contrary, I believe that fundamental fairness limits the maximum 
penalty to which this defendant should be subjected to that 
amount of incarceration which the government told him he could 
expect if he were to return illegally.  Therefore, I most 
respectfully dissent. 
   
